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When the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston chose “Rethinking the
International Monetary System” as the topic for its 43rd Economic
Conference, it was clear that the worst international ﬁnancial crisis in
decades had caused tremors within the economics profession and the
policymaking establishment. The miracle countries of Asia had suffered
sharp currency devaluation and deep economic downturns, the turmoil
had spilled over into Russia and Latin America, and a severe liquidity
crisis had brieﬂy threatened banking systems in the advanced countries.
Thus, economists and policymakers had begun to question some of their
most basic beliefs about appropriate international ﬁnancial arrangements.
Of course, as Paul Volcker was to note at the conference, the worst
international ﬁnancial crisis in 50 years occurs about once a decade, but
that recurrence conveys a telling message about the efﬁcacy of existing
arrangements.
The events of the 1990s—the European currency turmoil early in the
decade, the subsequent introduction of the euro, the relatively contained
Latin American crises of 1994–95, and the global ﬁnancial storms of
1997–98—have provoked many proposals for reform. But these propos-
als reﬂect differing, even contradictory, views about the underlying
problems and their solutions, and they do not always reveal a systemic
approach to reform. For instance, while some reformers advocate more
ﬂexible exchange rate arrangements, others seek irrevocably ﬁxed re-
gimes, at least for some countries. And while most policymakers remain
staunch supporters of free capital markets, some stress that volatile
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that capital controls just might be useful. Observers also hold diametri-
cally opposed views about the international lender of last resort. Some
believe that the lack of an effective international lender of last resort has
contributed to recent crises, while others are convinced that large
international rescues have produced moral hazard and more frequent
disruptions. As for policy surveillance, while some analysts argue that
growing integration requires increased policy coordination, they differ
as to whether such cooperation should be achieved through improved
transparency and market discipline or strengthened international gover-
nance.
In hopes of clarifying some of these issues, the Bank asked confer-
ence participants to examine key parts of current international monetary
arrangements: the eclectic exchange rate system, international capital
markets, the international lender of last resort, and policy coordination.
We also asked them to consider how these critical components interact.
We hoped that adopting a systemic approach would help to narrow the
differences among economic policymakers and identify priorities for
reform. Our ultimate goal was to deﬁne ways to enhance the beneﬁts of
global integration while limiting its costs. This article summarizes the
participants’ answers to our questions.
AH ISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS
In his opening address, historian Harold James provided a rather
skeptical review of efforts to reform the international monetary system
since the revolution in communications and transport of the mid nine-
teenth century started the process of “globalization.” While the current
debate on the international architecture has its roots in the recent ﬁnancial
crises of Mexico and East Asia, the underlying problems have been
contested in some form or another for a very long time. Over the last 150
years, proposals for large-scale reforms of the international ﬁnancial
system have been numerous, with no shortage of good ideas. Unfortu-
nately, the most common outcome of these past discussions has been the
partial realization of grand designs. The establishment of the gold
standard in the 1870s, for example, was the byproduct of the more
ambitious idea for a world currency union, advocated by Napoleon III in
1867. The idea had the backing of Germany and United States, but
eventually failed because Britain would not agree to a small change in the
weight and value of the pound.
For a reform proposal to have a chance of being successfully realized,
James argued, requires a strong will to reform and bilateral, if not
unilateral, leadership of the reform negotiations. The key to the success of
the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 lay in the unique combination of its
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tions. At that time, most analysts saw an urgent need to have an
institutional framework in place before the beginning of the postwar
period, and, while 44 countries were represented, the negotiations were
essentially between Britain and the United States, with the latter clearly
predominant.
The history of failed international monetary cooperation in the
interwar years provides a stark contrast with the success of the Bretton
Woods conference. Insufﬁcient urgency about reform explains why the
Bank for International Settlements failed to become an effective institu-
tion for international cooperation in crisis prevention. Created in 1930
before the international panic set in, the Bank had already ceased to
operate effectively in 1931, paralyzed by inadequate capitalization, con-
ﬂicting goals, and polarized opinions in France and Britain on the issue of
Germany’s war reparations. As for the World Economic Conference of
1933, while the ﬁnancial crises of 1931 and 1932 had made abundantly
apparent to all that “the world economy was crippled by monetary chaos
. . . and trade wars,” the lack of a bilateral or unilateral leadership made
it impossible to reach any consensus among the 66 participating coun-
tries.
All told, James noted, a historical survey of large-scale reform efforts
“inclines the observer to rather pessimistic conclusions” about the likely
outcomes of new proposals to overhaul the international ﬁnancial system.
While a new bilateral axis between Europe and the United States may be
emerging, and while this relationship may succeed in pushing new
projects to fruition, it is possible that the outcome could be bad. The risk,
according to James, is that the new bilateral relationship will push in the
direction of ﬁxed exchange rates, a solution that appeals to many
European businesses but that is “exactly the wrong sort of answer to the
crises of most emerging markets.” In addition, while some changes may
be needed to limit a country’s vulnerability to sudden capital ﬂow
reversals, a substantial buildup of protective measures may in the end
harm the international system. This scenario occurred during the Great
Depression, when the fear of destabilizing capital ﬂows led to cumulative
measures that ultimately caused the collapse of international trade. Not
infrequently, James warned, the remedies turn out to be worse than the
problems themselves.
WHY THE INTEREST IN REFORM?
In the introductory paper, Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni Olivei
provided an overview of recent changes in the economic environment
that have sparked interest in reform and of the debates surrounding key
aspects of the international ﬁnancial system. Little and Olivei argued that
the interest in reform stems from the perception that the Asian crisis was
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comings in current international arrangements. The international ﬁnan-
cial system may have worsened recent crises in several ways. First, the
recent liberalization of international capital markets, widely recom-
mended by the IMF and G-7 countries, severely limits a developing
country’s ability to pursue an independent monetary policy both under
ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes. Further, while previous inter-
national rescues may have created perverse incentives, the IMF currently
faces handicaps as an international lender of last resort since it cannot
lend quickly and reliably. Finally, while conditions in global capital
markets or neighboring countries’ policy mistakes create harmful spill-
overs, opportunities for meaningful policy coordination are currently
limited.
Little and Olivei observed that the recent crises have shaken the
economics profession’s conﬁdence concerning several basic issues, in-
cluding the ability to prescribe appropriate exchange rate policy. Opin-
ions also differ widely on how to weigh the pros and cons of capital
account liberalization. Still, important lessons have already been drawn
from recent crises. In particular, it is clear that unilateral pegs pose risks,
in that the demise of a peg can precipitate a creditors’ panic and the
resulting collapse in bank lending can have devastating effects on
economic activity. Moreover, countries must be wary of liberalizing their
capital accounts without adequate institutions for monitoring their bank-
ing sector. And greater transparency, disclosure, and better governance
are crucially important to improving supervision and reducing moral
hazard.
Beyond these lessons, Little and Olivei posited the need for more
fundamental changes. While free markets may promote growth over the
long run, capital ﬂows can be highly destabilizing in the short run; thus
capital controls may be advisable both as an emergency measure and as
a defense against systemic risk when ﬁnancial supervision is limited,
private sector risk-management is inadequate, and ﬁnancial markets are
thin. In addition, they proposed designing an international lender of last
resort that could mitigate ﬁnancial panics by providing timely short-term
liquidity to banking systems in need. Greater market-based surveillance
could help to limit the scope for international-lender-of-last-resort inter-
vention and might render more effective oversight than multilateral
institutions have generally achieved.
Little and Olivei also pointed out that issues of international policy
coordination and emergency liquidity are likely to prove irrepressible,
and unless some combination of better information, a more reliable
international lender of last resort, and more effective surveillance allows
governments to achieve greater stability, some emerging economies are
likely to seek protection by joining a currency bloc—even if these unions
do not represent optimum currency areas. Overall, Little and Olivei
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tional monetary system. To date, many proposals for reform have focused
on speciﬁc aspects of the problem—such as transparency and gover-
nance—which may reduce the frequency and severity of future crises, but
will not fully resolve the conﬂicting needs of all countries to participate in
integrated markets and to achieve stable economic growth.
In commenting on Little and Olivei’s paper, Toyoo Gyohten focused
on the recent East Asian experience. Gyohten stressed that many of the
problems that have prompted the current debate on “architecture” are
region-speciﬁc; thus, it is important to devise measures that are tailored
to region-speciﬁc needs. Many of the crisis-hit economies in East Asia
were experiencing macroeconomic imbalances, most notably in the form
of increasing external deﬁcits and inﬂation and interest rate differentials
vis-a `-vis the United States. In addition, while the countries in the region
had a dollar-peg, the currencies were still subject to large swings against
the yen that contributed to a worsening of the macroeconomic scenario.
Gyohten argued that East Asian countries should be prepared to remain
ﬂexible in their exchange rate arrangements when large distortions are
present, but that it is equally important that the United States and Japan
“cooperate more seriously to achieve greater stability and predictability
of the dollar-yen exchange rate.”
As concerns international capital ﬂows, Gyohten endorsed a strategy
for sequencing the liberalization of the capital account, together with a
package of emergency capital controls measures. He noted that the East
Asian crisis would have been less severe if capital ﬂows had been better
managed, and he favored market-friendly measures such as additional
reserve requirements or differentiated interest rates to regulate short-term
ﬂows. The liquidity shortage associated with the sudden reversal of
capital ﬂows in East Asia also points to the need for quick injections of
foreign currency liquidity. Yet it is unrealistic to expect that Mexican-style
rescues will be readily available in the future. The viable alternative,
according to Gyohten, is to establish a regional credit facility ﬁnanced by
countries that have close ties in the region. Such a facility could be “a
regional vehicle of the IMF, provided that regional members make
majority contributions and hold majority voting rights” to ensure that the
facility maintains the ﬂexibility necessary for timely interventions.
Finally, the East Asian crisis points to the need for a “forum to
conduct dialogues more focused and more relevant to the situation in the
region.” The lack of an adequate forum for conducting surveillance and
applying peer pressure for corrective measures was a serious shortcom-
ing before the East Asian crisis. A regional forum within the IMF would
provide a useful step toward better policy coordination in the region.
Ricardo Hausmann argued that the often-mentioned view that
moral hazard played a signiﬁcant role in the recent ﬁnancial crises is
fundamentally wrong. According to the “moral hazard view,” the pres-
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supervision and ﬁxed exchange rate arrangements, created a fertile
ground for excessive and poorly allocated international capital ﬂows.
Hausmann noted that the fundamental ﬂaw in this view is that capital
ﬂows across borders are actually surprisingly small. For example, capital-
labor ratios in Latin America are less than one-third those in the United
States, and at the current rate of net foreign investment into Latin
America, this difference will persist for centuries.
Hausmann contended that the true causes lie in two fundamental
problems faced by developing countries. First, foreigners are not willing
to lend to a developing country in that country’s own currency. Second,
domestic residents are similarly reluctant to lend long-term in the
domestic currency. This reluctance creates currency and maturity mis-
matches, since in order to ﬁnance long-term investment projects, a
developing country must either borrow in a foreign currency, or borrow
short-term in its own currency. These mismatches can generate currency
and ﬁnancial crises that feed on each other.
The solution, according to Hausmann, is not in greater exchange rate
ﬂexibility. Latin American countries with ﬂexible regimes have had
difﬁculties in developing deep ﬁnancial systems, because ﬂoating regimes
tend to generate currency appreciations in good times and depreciations
in bad times. Thus, domestic residents shy away from instruments
denominated in their ﬂoating currency because they offer limited oppor-
tunities for hedging against income ﬂuctuations.
The solution is for developing countries to abandon weak national
currencies and adopt a supranational currency. Such an arrangement
signals a serious precommitment not to devalue, thus avoiding currency
cum ﬁnancial crisis scenarios. This arrangement also eliminates the need
for an international lender of last resort except at the level of the currency
union, where sharing arrangements can be devised. In this way, the scope
for IMF interventions would be drastically reduced: Crises would be
addressed at a regional level, and the role of the IMF would be redeﬁned
to deal only with the exchange rates of the few supranational currencies.
EXCHANGE RATE CHOICES
Richard Cooper addressed the vexing question of optimal exchange
rate arrangements. Economists’ lack of fully persuasive answers is
especially unfortunate because, “for most countries, all but the largest
with the most developed domestic capital markets, the choice of ex-
change rate policy is probably their single most important macroeco-
nomic policy decision, strongly inﬂuencing their freedom of action and
effectiveness of other macroeconomic policies.” Moreover, the inade-
quacy of the existing theoretical frameworks for addressing exchange rate
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makers.”
In reviewing the history of thought on exchange rate arrangements,
Cooper noted that the interwar experience with ﬂexible exchange rates,
admittedly under extremely difﬁcult circumstances, was generally
viewed by contemporaries as highly unsatisfactory. In an inﬂuential
study, Ragnar Nurske strongly argued in 1944 against exchange rate
ﬂexibility, on the grounds that ﬂoating rates are destabilizing in their
behavior and thus are a substantial source of uncertainty for trade and
capital formation. This aversion to exchange rate ﬂexibility underlay the
postwar economic order negotiated at Bretton Woods in 1944.
Still, the Bretton Woods arrangement of exchange rates ﬁxed beyond
a narrow band of permissible variation eventually found itself under
severe strain, with monetary authorities holding an unsustainable parity
for too long, and then folding to the speculative pressures from resurgent
international capital movements. As a result, an increasing number of
economists started to favor some form of exchange rate ﬂexibility among
major currencies. Harry G. Johnson’s essay “The Case for Flexible
Exchange Rates, 1969,” whose title intentionally drew on Milton Fried-
man’s famous memorandum of 1950, was very inﬂuential in shaping
economists’ views on the topic. According to Cooper, the essay appears
“somewhat naı ¨ve” today, with many of its claims based on “an idealiza-
tion of the world of ﬁnancial markets without serious reference to their
actual behavior.”
The trend toward greater exchange rate ﬂexibility among major
currencies that started in 1973 was subsequently reversed in Europe,
where ﬂexible rates were considered disruptive to the functioning of the
Common Market and were replaced by the European Monetary System.
The recent creation of a European common currency, and the role played
by ﬁxed but adjustable rates in triggering the ﬁnancial crises in Latin
America and East Asia in the 1990s, are events that have infused new life
into the exchange rate debate.
According to Cooper, several factors have inhibited serious resolu-
tion of exchange rate choices, in particular “the continuing use by the
economics profession of an extraordinarily primitive theory of money in
its theorizing,” and the lack of convincing empirical evidence on the
inﬂuence of exchange rate arrangements on economic performance. Still,
the post-Bretton Woods experience with ﬂoating has shown that John-
son’s prediction that real exchange rate movements would track inﬂation
differentials is largely counterfactual, with real exchange movements
dominated in the short and medium run by nominal exchange rate
ﬂuctuations. In addition, while ﬂoating rates among major currencies
have not proved disruptive to the extent envisaged by Nurske, Cooper
conjectured that even Johnson would have been surprised by the recent
swings in the real exchange rate between United States and Japan,
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exchange rate regime.”
In laying out his view on exchange rate choices, Cooper maintained
Johnson’s distinction between developing and developed countries.
Cooper argued that for developing countries, more is at work than the
well-known policy “trilemma,” whereby independent monetary policy
and ﬁxed exchange rates are incompatible with freedom of capital
movements. When ﬁnancial markets are poorly developed, independent
monetary policy and ﬂexible exchange rates are also incompatible with
freedom of capital movements. The reason is that a developing country’s
price level tends to be strongly inﬂuenced by the nominal exchange rate
vis-a `-vis the rest of the world, and with thin ﬁnancial markets a single
large player can move the exchange rate radically. As a result, changes in
portfolio sentiment can have large effects on the domestic price level
through movements in the exchange rate, and potentially “disrupt [goods
and services] markets on which the economic well-being of the majority
of residents depends.”
Thus, in Cooper’s view, the two prescriptions regularly extended to
developing countries, to ﬂoat the exchange rate and to liberalize interna-
tional capital movements, may be in great tension with each other. For
monetary policy to pursue independent goals, some form of restrictions
on capital movements may be necessary not only for tightly managed
exchange rates, but also for pure ﬂoats. The actual exchange rate choice
for developing countries is not easy, depending, among other factors, on
“how ﬂexible are their wages and rents; on how supple and effective is
their management of ﬁscal and monetary policy; on their administrative
capacity to enforce restrictions on capital movements.” Given the com-
plexity of the choice, “countries are not obviously foolish for being
reluctant to embrace ﬂoating exchange rates enthusiastically.”
For rich and diversiﬁed countries, Cooper noted that exchange rate
markets have often moved in ways inconsistent with Johnson’s view of
farseeing and universally stabilizing behavior. Such a failure is likely to
become more apparent in the near future, when ﬁnancial factors will
come to dominate exchange rate determination to an even greater extent
than they do today. Thus, volatility among major currencies is likely to
increase as exchange rates become “ever more important in determining
the proﬁtability of trade and investment.” For these reasons, Cooper
argued that the recent introduction of a single currency among European
countries could be taken a step further, with the creation of a currency
union among Europe, Japan, and the United States. While acknowledging
that such a proposition is politically unrealistic at this stage, Cooper
conjectured that as rich countries become even more diversiﬁed, “real
shocks among these entities will not be radically asymmetrical.” The
reduction in asymmetric disturbances among industrial countries will
limit the appeal of ﬂexible exchange rates as a shock absorber. As a result,
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ﬂexibility, even for large countries.”
Takatoshi Ito praised Cooper’s comprehensive analysis, his care to
distinguish between exchange rate choices for developing and developed
countries, and his pragmatic approach to capital ﬂows. Ito noted that
Cooper did not seem to embrace the two-corner-solution view, whereby
a developing country should have either a truly ﬁxed exchange rate
system (such as a currency board or a currency union), or a freely ﬂoating
exchange rate. While Cooper was skeptical about the desirability of free
ﬂoats for developing countries, he did not really answer his own
question, “What should developing countries do?” Ito would have
preferred Cooper to explore in more detail the “middle ground,” and
discuss the exchange rate regime’s choice in the context of an optimal
sequencing of reforms.
As concerns Cooper’s vision of a common currency for the world, Ito
noted that Cooper did not provide a transition scenario toward the single
currency. In this respect, Ito envisioned two possible paths. The ﬁrst is to
ﬁx or have a narrow target zone among the three major currencies, and
then have developing countries follow the lead. The second path is to
have the three major currencies evolve ﬁrst into regional currencies, and
then link among themselves. Ito considered this last scenario as the most
plausible, with some probability that the North and South Americas will
evolve into a dollar zone, and that Euroland will extend to all Europe and
Africa. However, according to Ito, it is very difﬁcult at this stage to
discern which currency is likely to become predominant in Asia.
Fred Bergsten agreed with Cooper that fully ﬂexible exchange rates
can be extremely costly for most developing economies. He added that
the costs were also high for the United States under Beryl Sprinkel during
the period 1981 to 1985, when a dollar appreciation prolonged a recession
in “much of American manufacturing and agriculture, with some irre-
versible effects because of induced foreign investment.” In addition,
given that few countries meet the criteria for the adoption of a truly ﬁxed
exchange rate arrangement, the often mentioned two-corner solution is of
limited practical relevance. Bergsten thought that Cooper’s case for a
move toward a currency union among the United States, Japan, and
Europe a decade or two into the twenty-ﬁrst century is correct, but that
this leaves open the issue of how a managed ﬂoat should operate in the
next 10 to 20 years.
Bergsten advocated wide band (610 to 15 percent) target zones
among the three major currencies. The purpose of such target zones is to
avoid “huge and prolonged misalignments” that are costly both to the
countries involved and to the world economy as a whole. According to
Bergsten, wide margins would encourage stabilizing speculation, while
the target zones could be defended by sterilized intervention and,
possibly, by changes in national monetary policies “consistent with the
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Bergsten argued, is ad hoc episodic intervention by the G-7 as is actually
practiced, with the disadvantage that it is almost always undertaken too
late. Target zones would achieve “most of the virtues of both ﬁxity and
ﬂoating while avoiding the worst features of both,” and they would
provide a transitional regime that, via a progressive narrowing of the
band, would evolve into the currency union envisioned by Cooper.
Catherine Mann questioned Cooper’s assertion that the post-Bretton
Woods regime with ﬂexible rates has been a disappointment. She noted
that growth in employment and incomes has been greater under ﬂexible
than under ﬁxed rates, although a causal link is difﬁcult to establish.
Mann argued that the evaluation of alternative exchange rate regimes is
difﬁcult, since it involves a comparison between second-best alternatives
and an assessment of the costs of exchange rate volatility. For example, a
developing country’s choice of an exchange rate regime is often decided
separately from the degree of capital openness. But to the extent that a
relatively rigid exchange rate arrangement requires more capital controls
than a ﬂexible exchange rate, it is unclear whether the reduction in
exchange rate volatility achieved in the rigid regime can more than
compensate for the cumulative inefﬁciencies and distortions caused by
the controls on capital ﬂows.
Mann also noted that “policymakers often wish that the exchange
rate regime would solve all their policy dilemmas.” For example, by
establishing an exchange rate target zone, policymakers hope to make
private capital a stabilizing force in the exchange rate market. Still, given
that the willingness of policymakers to defend the zone is always in
doubt, the target zone itself can provide no more discipline to the market
than it does to policymakers. In addition, policymakers often wish that
the exchange rate regime would force broad and substantive changes in
the economy, changes that policymakers themselves cannot accomplish.
The euro has been introduced with hopes that it will foster a liberalization
of labor laws and promote a more efﬁcient corporate behavior. While it
might be too early to judge the euro’s effectiveness in achieving these
goals, Mann suggested that this is generally “too much to ask of the
exchange rate.” An exchange rate regime per se cannot force changes in
a policy stance, even though movements in the exchange rate may force
such changes.
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS AND
EMERGING MARKETS:A MENDING THE
RULES OF THE GAME?
Sebastian Edwards explored the Chilean experience with controls on
capital mobility over the last 20 years. He speculated that while a
large-scale reform of the IMF and other major multilateral institutions is
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country-speciﬁc rules governing capital mobility are likely to occur. The
East Asian crisis of 1997–98 has revived a debate on the appropriate
sequencing of reforms, and speciﬁcally on the appropriate timing for
liberalizing the capital account. Analysts have reached a wide consensus
on the proposition that major ﬁscal imbalances have to be tackled ﬁrst,
and that the liberalization of the capital account should only take place
thereafter. This sequencing reﬂects the fact that a real exchange rate
appreciation induced by large capital inﬂows will most likely cause a
deterioration in a country’s competitiveness, possibly frustrating the
reform process.
Recently, several authors, with Edwards ﬁguring prominently
among them, have augmented this proposition with the prescription that
relaxation of capital controls “should only occur once a modern and
efﬁcient bank regulatory and supervisory framework is in place,” that is,
at a late stage of the reform effort. Poor bank regulation in a newly
liberalized environment can result in excessive borrowing from abroad,
the more so when implicit or explicit guarantees are in place.
Edwards, however, warned that the efﬁcacy of capital controls in
shielding a country from a real exchange rate appreciation, from over-
borrowing, or from sudden capital ﬂow reversals, should not be over-
stated. The Chilean experience with capital controls is a case in point
because, according to Edwards, it suggests that restrictions on capital
inﬂows are unlikely to reduce a country’s vulnerability to ﬁnancial
turbulence. This is especially true when controls encourage “complacent
and careless behavior on behalf of policymakers and market partici-
pants.” In addition, evidence that Chile’s controls helped prevent a real
exchange rate appreciation or allowed the pursuit of an independent
monetary policy is regarded by Edwards as scant, at best.
In examining the effectiveness of Chilean capital controls, Edwards
ﬁrst noted that over the period 1978 to 1982 controls did not prevent a
full-blown currency and ﬁnancial crisis. One of the main reasons for the
1982 collapse was that the restrictions were not accompanied by an
adequate effort at supervising the quality of bank portfolios. Despite an
environment where short-term inﬂows had been controlled quite se-
verely, the level of long-term foreign indebtedness in the private banking
system surged dramatically in the early 1980s. Such a surge was not seen
by regulators as worrisome, on the grounds that foreign indebtedness
carried no government guarantee. Still, once the presence of bad bank
loans and of an overvalued real exchange rate became apparent, foreign
capital inﬂows came to a sudden stop and domestic investors started a
capital ﬂight. The ensuing ﬁnancial collapse was so widespread that the
government had to bail out a large portion of the banking system, at a
cost of approximately 18 percent of pre-crisis GDP.
Edwards then proceeded to analyze Chile’s experience with capital
RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW 11controls in the 1990s. Controls on short-term inﬂows were reinstated in
1991 with the two goals of (1) reducing the total volume of ﬂows to delay
a real exchange rate appreciation, and (2) tilting the composition of
Chile’s foreign liabilities toward longer maturities to mitigate the coun-
try’s vulnerability to ﬁnancial instability. In addition, the authorities
expected that capital controls would help the country pursue an inde-
pendent monetary policy.
Overall, Edwards argued, the controls were largely ineffective.
Regarding the volume of inﬂows, Edwards noted that with the exception
of a brief decline in 1993, the total volume of ﬂows into the country
continued to increase until 1998. The restrictions did affect the composi-
tion of inﬂows, with shorter ﬂows declining steeply relative to long-term
ﬂows. As a result, Chile’s short-term debt as a proportion of total debt
decreased from 19 percent in 1990 to less than 5 percent in 1997. Still,
Edwards argued that these ﬁgures tend to understate Chile’s vulnerabil-
ity to sudden capital ﬂow reversals. The reason is that the data report the
contracted maturity of ﬂows, but do not measure the “residual” maturity,
that is, the value of foreign outstanding debt that will mature in less than
a year. If one uses this more appropriate measure, the proportion of
short-term debt remained above 50 percent in mid 1996, and Chile’s
position did not appear to differ greatly from that of Argentina, a country
with no capital controls during the period.
As concerns the effects of capital controls on the real exchange rate,
Edwards showed that, contrary to the expectations of Chilean authorities,
the introduction of controls did not seem to affect the behavior of the real
exchange rate. Comparing a period with no restrictions, 1986 to 1991,
with the more recent period with controls suggests that the estimated
response of the real exchange rate to an increase in inﬂows is almost
identical.
Finally, the Chilean monetary authority expected that the introduc-
tion of controls would help it pursue a relatively tight policy, a stance that
had become increasingly difﬁcult to sustain during the late 1980s and
early 1990s because higher domestic rates were attracting an increasingly
large volume of capital. However, Edwards showed that the equilibrium
interest differential (after adjusting for expected depreciation) between
Chile and the United States remained remarkably similar during the
periods 1986–91 and 1991–96. In addition, despite the presence of
controls, over the 1991–96 period deviations from the equilibrium interest
rate differential reverted to zero almost as fast as during the previous
period, suggesting that the restrictions did not prevent arbitrage and did
not allow the monetary authority greater control over domestic interest
rates.
In sum, Edwards suggested that while controls on capital move-
ments should be lifted carefully and gradually, the true solution to
problems caused by volatile capital ﬂows is to be found in pursuing
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building adequate supervisory and regulatory institutions.
Tom de Swaan agreed with most of Edwards’s conclusions. He
noted that the optimal sequencing of reforms was neglected by a number
of emerging economies, and that “at the time, the multilateral organiza-
tions and the international ﬁnancial community failed to recognize the
full signiﬁcance of this error.” De Swaan argued that the Chilean crisis of
1982 raises the question as to whether stricter prudential regulation, for
example in the form of ceilings on banks’ net foreign debt position and
foreign currency exposure, may be preferable to capital controls. In his
view, improvements in supervision and regulation can go “a long way
toward preventing unjustiﬁable large capital inﬂows that might tempo-
rarily lead to impressive but unsustainable growth rates.”
An effective way to boost the efﬁciency and improve the transpar-
ency and soundness of an emerging country’s ﬁnancial system is,
according to de Swaan, to open the ﬁnancial services market to foreign
bank competition. Emerging countries have been traditionally reluctant
to do so, because of the competitive threat to local banks. Still, foreign
banks’ penetration would introduce international standards and facilitate
their adoption by local banks.
As concerns the most recent Chilean experience with capital controls,
de Swaan argued that the reason why the restrictions were not very
effective is that lower short-term inﬂows were entirely compensated by
higher long-term inﬂows. Exchange rate and independent monetary
policy objectives can be achieved only with “very extensive restrictions
on short- and long-term in- and outﬂows of capital.” Given the high costs
of such extensive restrictions, it is preferable to limit them to emergency
situations, provided they are temporary and improvements in domestic
macroeconomic policies and ﬁnancial supervision are also undertaken.
Similarly, controls on the capital account should eventually be lifted, but
gradually and in conformity with the appropriate sequencing of reforms.
In this respect the IMF should monitor a country’s progress and set
timetables, “as an aid to the introduction of the needed domestic reforms
against vested interests at home.”
William Cline welcomed Edwards’s evaluation of the Chilean
experience because Chile is “invariably cited as the example of experience
with disincentives to short-term capital inﬂows.” Cline’s position was
that while capital ﬂows, just like trade ﬂows, contribute to an efﬁcient
allocation of resources, Chilean-style disincentives to short-term ﬂows
still belong on the menu of policy options, preferably in a temporary form
and only in cases of global capital market exuberance and large inﬂows.
While Edwards argued that Chile had a crisis in 1982 despite the presence
of severe capital controls, Cline remarked that such a crisis was the result
of large current account deﬁcits and an overvalued real exchange rate. In
other words, the Chilean crisis in 1982 was not a capital account crisis, as
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external deﬁcit, even in the absence of short-term debt, and a ﬁxed
exchange rate made it easy for domestic residents to shift savings abroad
when conﬁdence started dwindling.
As concerns the controls during the 1991–98 period, Cline was
surprised by Edwards’s ﬁnding that, when considering residual maturi-
ties, the share of short-term debt in total debt in Chile was not dissimilar
to that in other Latin American and East Asian countries. Cline argued
that this similarity might reﬂect the fact that Edwards considers bank
debt only. Broadening the measure to include nonbank debt shows,
according to Cline, that the portion of Chile’s total debt maturing in less
than a year was quite low, suggesting that controls were not ineffective.
Moreover, Edwards’s ﬁnding that the total amount of long- and short-
term external debt was not affected by the presence of controls might be
a desirable outcome, since it means that controls can “dollar for dollar,
shift your short-term debt to long-term debt.”
Cline found Edwards’s discussion on the impact of capital controls
on the real exchange rate and domestic interest rates to be tangential to
the policy debate on architecture, which focuses instead on whether
controls can limit a country’s vulnerability to sudden capital ﬂow
reversals. In this respect, Edwards’s case for the limited effectiveness of
Chilean-style capital controls was unconvincing, according to Cline.
Foreign direct investment to emerging economies has been remarkably
stable throughout all recent crises, and in situations where emerging
countries are awash with money, it seems prudent to provide tax
incentives favoring such long-term inﬂows.
THE POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
In his address on the politics of the international monetary system,
Robert Keohane argued that economic policymaking would be far more
effective if it reﬂected a good understanding of operative political
pressures. He presented ﬁve major constraints affecting the use of power
in the international arena. The most fundamental constraint relates to
politicians’ self-interest. Because most leaders are chosen domestically, in
liberal democracies international agreements will only be made and
enforced when they serve the politicians’ domestic agenda. Domestic
ideas about the impact of international monetary policies on the domestic
economy will generally matter a great deal, but, in the short run
politicians may simply seek to shift blame, or at least to avoid it (as when
the Russian crisis unleashed Congressional approval of IMF funding).
Similarly, interest groups, like money center banks, may play a major
role in speciﬁc cases, especially if the issues involved are not widely
discussed.
Second, political/military relationships will inﬂuence the develop-
14 Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni P. Oliveiment of international institutions. Here, Keohane pointed to the role of
these links in the creation of the Marshall Plan and the European
Monetary Union. Third, credibility is likely to be the key source of power
in the Information Age; thus, states where monetary institutions are not
fully trusted will seek links with nations/institutions of unquestioned
credibility, for example, the Federal Reserve or the European Central
Bank. Fourth, in multilateral organizations, precedents matter, and play-
ers must consider the impact of today’s bargains on tomorrow’s rules.
Thus, Keohane speculated that international decision-making in institu-
tions governed by precedent may strengthen the pull of the long-term
collective interest.
Fifth, referring to Albert Hirschman, Keohane noted that the exit
options available to mobile factors of production amplify their political
voice, possibly disproportionately. By contrast, democratic institutions
can empower immobile factors by providing a governing framework
within which market forces must operate. In this context, Keohane
speculated that democratic publics will want to expand the scope of
issues governed by multilateral institutions. In summarizing these points,
Keohane concluded that global institutions, which are hard to create and
hard to change, matter because they help deﬁne incentives and capacities
for, as well as constraints on, the use of power.
Arguing that politics involves social purpose as well as imperatives,
Keohane then proposed that three important values—autonomy, equity,
and accountability—be added to the efﬁciency/political feasibility trade-
off which economists often use. Regarding the efﬁciency/autonomy
trade-off, he suggested that the value of local control depends on the
quality of domestic decision-making; autonomy is valuable in democra-
cies, less so in autocracies and kleptocracies. Because all political systems,
including democracy, give little weight to equity, Keohane also suggested
that the designers and managers of the international monetary system
should seek to promote that value at the margin. Finally, Keohane
concluded that the new century will need a Madisonian moment in which
we learn to create and simultaneously constrain power in the world
economy. Quoting Madison’s advice that “. . . you must ﬁrst enable the
government to control the governed and in the next place advise it to
control itself,” Keohane called for the creation of international institutions
that can deal effectively with world ﬁnancial issues and remain account-
able in the long run to democratic publics. Because democracies will only
support global ﬁnancial institutions viewed as serving the public interest,
the policy process must be transparent, and over time policy outcomes
must reﬂect the public will. But since policy effectiveness can create
legitimacy, this requirement need not imply direct electoral control, and
short-term policy measures can be insulated from short-term political
pressures.
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WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?
In addressing the question, “Does the world need an international
lender of last resort?” Jeffrey Sachs answered “yes,” as long as the
emphasis is on last, as opposed to ﬁrst. Although various measures can
and should reduce the demands on an international lender of last resort
(ILLR), in the end, we are going to need such a facility.
According to Sachs, the need for an ILLR arises during liquidity
crises, which, despite skepticism on the part of some theorists, occur
when borrowers cannot obtain short-term funds even when the rate of
return on the investment in question would exceed the market cost of
capital. Identifying three types of liquidity crises, he pointed ﬁrst to
ﬁnancial panics which result when short-term debt looms large relative to
short-term liquidity, some trigger spooks investors into calling loans, and
the borrower cannot reﬁnance. Sachs sees the Mexican and East Asian
crises as prime examples of ﬁnancial panics. The second type of liquidity
crisis, a debt overhang, involves a bankrupt debtor in need of working
capital. In this country, Chapter 11, section 364 of the U.S. bankruptcy
code allows the court to facilitate an otherwise unavailable ﬂow of
short-term capital to bankrupt entities. The third type of liquidity crisis
stems from the collapse of the public sector, as in a revolution, when the
state cannot collect taxes or deliver basic public goods. The market will
not provide funds during such a collapse, even absent a debt overhang or
bank panic.
In the face of such liquidity crises, the ILLR has four functions, Sachs
argued. First, the ILLR is meant to forestall panic by its very existence.
Then it is supposed to lend into panic, debt overhangs, and public
collapse. Nevertheless, Sachs suggested, alternatives to ILLR loans are (or
could be) available and may be preferable. For example, controls on
short-term capital inﬂows, prudential limits on bank liabilities, and
ﬂexible exchange rates could have prevented recent crises by keeping the
ratio of debt to foreign currency reserves from rising to panic-stirring
levels. Another alternative to ILLR lending into panic is suspension of
payment—the natural solution in the absence of ofﬁcial rescues, Sachs
argued. Indeed, as Sachs sees it, banks would roll over their credits to
emerging market borrowers more readily if the IMF did not provide the
funds that allow them to extract all their assets. He pointed out that,
despite the IMF loan package announced in early December, the Korean
crisis did not really end until late that month “when the Federal Reserve
engineered a roll-over of Korea’s short-term debts.”
In the case of a debt overhang, the alternative to ILLR lending is a
standstill on debt repayments, with a new legal regime to facilitate the
ﬂow of working capital to the bankrupt state. A simple statement that the
next $100 million tranche gets priority should sufﬁce to start the ﬂow of
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tional system pursues clearly bankrupt debtors for years, until a Brady
Plan or HIPC program eventually cancels parts of the debt in a very
clumsy fashion. In the third kind of crisis, a public sector collapse, Sachs
sees no alternative to ILLR loans.
Sachs went on to argue that the current system handles international
liquidity crises very badly. He pointed in particular to excessive use of
exchange rate pegs, reckless capital account liberalization, and the way
in which the risk-weights used to calculate BIS capital requirements
encourage short-term inter-bank lending. He also claimed that the
(insufﬁciently) “big bailouts” used to pay off creditors did not restore
conﬁdence, in part because LLR activities require a sensitivity that the
IMF seems to lack. Referring to the negative reaction to IMF-inspired
bank closures in Indonesia, Sachs suggested that IMF actions often
worsened Asia’s panic. By contrast, Sachs pointed approvingly to the
Fed’s role as a crisis manager, rather than a crisis lender, in the rescue of
the hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management. In such cases, accord-
ing to Sachs, the manager calls in the private lenders and says, “Smile,
we’re rolling over”—to widespread relief that a crisis has been “avoid-
ed.” Thus, Sachs would encourage ﬁnding ways to bail-in the private
sector. He also reiterated the need for a regime, akin to Chapter 9 for U.S.
municipalities, that would recognize the ﬁscal insolvency of sovereign
governments. He applauded the IMF’s newly created facility for lending
to countries in conﬂict or immediate post-conﬂict circumstances, such as
civil war.
In sum, Sachs concluded that the world does need an ILLR, but it
does not need a multilateral institution trying to manage 70 countries, as
now exists. This unfortunate situation has evolved because the current
system does not allow nations to discharge debt, and because recent
policies on exchange rate pegs and capital account liberalization have
allowed volatile short-term capital ﬂows to “rule the system.”
In commenting on Jeffrey Sachs’s remarks, Henry Kaufman began
by pointing out that LLR issues are much more complex in a global than
in a domestic setting, where the beneﬁciaries are usually commercial
banks. He also noted that the new multilateral European Central Bank
has very restricted LLR responsibilities and that the IMF was not de-
signed as an LLR—given its limited resources and cumbersome decision-
making process.
Thus, starting from a different premise than Sachs, Kaufman also
focused on the need to reduce crises through improved supervision and
regulation although, he noted, the emphasis on banks may be misplaced
in an era of widespread securitization. Kaufman also sought to highlight
the need for the major industrial countries to recognize their own
responsibilities. He pointed out that the major countries sometimes ﬂood
the world with liquidity that seeks a “decent” return in the emerging
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crisis, investors from the industrial nations offer to “help out,” by buying
the emerging country’s banks and other businesses—at prices far below
their levels of four or ﬁve years earlier. Noting aspects of unpalatable
ﬁnancial imperialism in this chain of events, Kaufman feared that vested
interests might thwart the needed improvements in supervision and
regulation in the industrial countries.
Kaufman also ﬂagged ﬁnancial trends that may have aggravated
recent crises. For instance, while increased securitization may give the
illusion of improved liquidity (reducing risk aversion), marketability is
not the same thing as liquidity. Moreover, the trend toward marking all
asset prices to market may have strengthened the harshness of market
discipline since marking to market is not a science; the last quote is just
an indicator and may not prevail. Ironically, market participants now
want to quantify and model risk just as the supervisory authorities want
to shift to a more judgmental approach—rightly, according to Kaufman,
since risk models are based on historical patterns and cannot cope with
developments beyond historic bounds.
All in all, Kaufman saw no need for an ILLR but advocated improved
supervision and regulation, starting in the industrial countries. Financial
crises affecting lenders in the major industrial countries are more likely to
create truly systemic problems than are crises within the emerging
markets, he contended.
In his discussion, Jeffrey Frankel began by agreeing with Kaufman
that the IMF cannot serve as a traditional LLR because it cannot print
dollars or lend freely against good collateral. While the IMF can create
SDRs, it can never do so at short notice, and true collateral rarely exists.
Although the new Contingent Credit Line is a limited step in the right
direction, the world is not ready for a big expansion of Fund resources.
Still, Frankel sees today’s IMF as raising many of the issues that
surround a more traditional LLR. Citing his Theorem on the Legion
Criticisms of the IMF (“For every critique, there exists an equal and
opposite critique.”), Frankel responded to several pairs of countervailing
views and found that, on balance, the IMF/international community
reacted appropriately to recent crises. Grouping many criticisms under
the umbrella arguments, “The IMF is too generous and creates moral
hazard” versus “The IMF is too severe and creates needless recessions,”
Frankel contended that moral hazard was not the fundamental market
failure since current capital/labor ratios suggest the need for larger, not
smaller, capital ﬂows to the developing countries. On the other hand, to
those who see the IMF as too strict, he pointed out that many crises were
largely homegrown.
More speciﬁcally, under “markets work best without interference”
versus “ﬁnancial markets work badly,” Frankel ﬁrst acknowledged the
existence of contagion. But to those arguing that ﬁnancial liberalization is
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are on balance helpful; like superhighways, they smooth the way but
require a cautious approach and, possibly, airbags. Concerning the
conditions attached to IMF loan programs (too weak/too strong), Frankel
pointed out that critics disagree about what mistakes the crisis countries
made; for example, except for the baht, it is not clear that Asian currencies
were actually overvalued. Moreover, the downturns that followed the
crises largely resulted from devaluation and loss of conﬁdence, not from
the IMF response. Finally, Frankel argued that the IMF’s evolving
emphasis on micro reforms (supervision, governance) as a condition for
lending was fully justiﬁed. Frankel views conditional IMF lending as
preferable to the likely alternative, bilateral aid with less objective or
constructive conditions.
Frankel ended by discussing the uncertain availability of interna-
tional rescues. He argued that investors could not possibly have counted
on a Mexican-style bailout since the U.S. Congress had said “never
again,” and had ruled out using the Exchange Stabilization Fund in
Thailand, while the Senate was refusing to authorize increased IMF
funding. But Frankel also claimed that such uncertainty is useful since,
like the ambiguity surrounding “too big to fail,” it limits moral hazard. In
the global context, moreover, the ambiguity is real since no one knows
beforehand what the political process will produce.
POLICYMAKING IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD:
FROM SURVEILLANCE TO ... ?
Barry Eichengreen began by noting that while recent crises have
underscored the need to adjust domestic policies to account for cross-
border spillovers, they have also sparked doubts about the efﬁcacy of
multilateral surveillance. Moreover, calls for reform show little consensus
on how to strengthen this process and avoid and manage crises. In
presenting his roadmap, Eichengreen argued that international standards
must form the basis for future multilateral surveillance. He also offered
suggestions for making IMF oversight and crisis management more
effective.
To build his case for standards, Eichengreen posited that the world
community has an interest in seeing that all countries participating in
global markets adopt minimally acceptable policies on transparency and
supervision. In Eichengreen’s view, these standards would deﬁne agreed
principles but allow countries to meet the criteria in ways that reﬂect
structural and cultural differences. Thus, they might mute recent criticism
that IMF surveillance has become too micro, invasive, and ill suited to
local conditions.
Because the IMF and the G-7’s Financial Stability Forum lack
adequate expertise in all relevant areas, Eichengreen urged that the
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expects the IMF to play a crucial role in gaining compliance. While
self-regulatory groups or private credit rating agencies could possibly
issue the timely, realistic reviews of national policies required for market
discipline, if they fail to provide them (as in 1997 Asia), the IMF may have
to publish its evaluations. Further, because market participants can
become overoptimistic, the IMF may have to use program conditions and
differential interest rates on its loans to foster compliance.
Will the IMF be willing to criticize its members? Eichengreen has
doubts. Indeed, he believes that IMF policies often serve the political
agendas of its dominant members; thus, he recommended giving the IMF
more independence by prohibiting its Executive Directors from taking
instruction from national governments and by giving them an explicit
mandate to foster policies that “maximize stability, prosperity, and growth.”
He also urged requiring that IMF policymaking be more transparent.
Turning to crisis management, Eichengreen saw two sets of prob-
lems requiring IMF loans: country problems and systemic problems. To
reduce moral hazard, loans triggered by country problems should be
limited to an amount allowing a government to perform its core functions
but not to pay off all existing creditors. By contrast, in systemic crises,
when adverse external events threaten to destabilize countries with strong
policies, the Fund must be able to provide large loans on an emergency
basis. He noted that the new Contingent Credit Line is intended to meet
this need.
To make Fund efforts to limit its loans and reduce moral hazard
credible, Eichengreen argued that the world community must make
orderly workouts easier by including collective representation, majority
voting, and sharing clauses in debt contracts. But since a ﬁrst mover
problem has emerged, he suggested that the G-7 make collective action
clauses a condition for issuing bonds in their markets and that the IMF
lend at lower rates to countries adopting them.
Ideally, banks should internalize currency and maturity risks by
hedging. But in practice, Eichengreen believes that regulators in emerg-
ing markets may have to resort to measures like taxes on capital inﬂows,
in addition to improving bank regulation and opening their capital
accounts with caution. Because ﬂexible exchange rates encourage hedg-
ing and discourage excessive use of foreign currency credit, Eichengreen
also argued that developing countries should eschew explicit exchange
rate targets and limit intervention. While he observed that some countries
may want to dollarize to gain better access to global capital markets, he
concluded that for most of them, currency unions can only be a vision for
tomorrow; exchange rate ﬂexibility is the reality of today.
Eichengreen sees little promise in regional surveillance or regional
funds to supplement the IMF. While proponents argue that neighbors
have the greatest stakes, can exert the strongest pressure, and offer the
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lack Europe’s historical taste for integration. In addition, competitive
markets for advice may not work as well as competitive markets for good
ideas, for the most palatable advice is not necessarily the best. Finally, as
the failure of the EMS in 1992-93 demonstrated, strong-currency countries
are rarely willing to extend unlimited support to weak-currency neigh-
bors, even in Europe.
In summing up, Eichengreen proposed four central pillars for the
new ﬁnancial architecture: international standards; prudential taxes on
capital inﬂows; greater exchange rate ﬂexibility for most countries; and
the inclusion of collective action clauses in loan contracts to create a
viable alternative to ever bigger IMF bailouts. He argued that the four are
a package. If, for example, the international community does not facilitate
loan restructuring, then the IMF cannot credibly refuse to rescue crisis-
stricken countries; and if the IMF cannot plausibly limit its loans,
emerging market countries will have little incentive to adopt more
ﬂexible exchange rates. Thus, he gave priority to gaining G-7 support for
all four pillars. An independent IMF is a task for the future.
In commenting, Ralph Bryant noted that the world’s political
structure has become increasingly complex and confrontational as the
number of governing units has grown. Nevertheless, economic interde-
pendence is surging, even while the market–government mix differs
greatly across states. Thus, the world’s political economy remains at an
untidy, intermediate stage of evolution.
Inevitably, Bryant believes, international collective-action problems
will grow in importance, forcing nations to shift a wider range of
functions to global institutions. For example, to offset market failures,
most societies have established domestic institutions of collective gover-
nance, with agreed accounting standards, prudential regulation, and
limited facilities for crisis lending. If ensuring stable ﬁnancial markets at
the national level requires collective governance, logic suggests that a
similar approach may be needed at the global level as well. But, he
maintained, the political preconditions for expanding global governance
do not yet exist. While the world community is beginning to agree on
standard accounting practices, for instance, it does not yet agree on how
to monitor their use. Similarly, global institutions with oversight respon-
sibilities remain embryonic, and G-7 coordination is largely undeveloped
even though the cumulative impact of their policies is critically important
to world welfare. Labeling his preferred approach “pragmatic incremen-
talism,” Bryant encouraged reformers to stretch multilateral cooperation
and strengthen global institutions but warned that they must not demand
too much too soon.
Characterizing Eichengreen as a fellow pragmatist, Bryant’s criti-
cisms concerned Eichengreen’s sins of omission, not of commission. First,
Bryant suggested, Eichengreen fails to give adequate attention to the role
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U.S. savings and loan crisis, and Japan’s ongoing problems with weak
ﬁnancial institutions, Bryant suggested that if reformers want to encour-
age further collective action, they should be careful about focusing blame
for inadequate accounting, bankruptcy, and oversight procedures on the
emerging markets alone.
Bryant suggested that Eichengreen’s second sin of omission lies in
his restricted view of surveillance, his focus on ﬁnancial standards and
ﬁnancial supervision. Bryant believes that surveillance must apply to all
types of policies, particularly macro policies, particularly in the major
countries. For him, encouraging stable, predictable, and mutually consis-
tent macro policies should be the central aim of surveillance. Such a goal
requires a far better understanding of the interactions among national
economies than currently exists.
Turning to Eichengreen’s proposal for making the IMF more inde-
pendent, Bryant asked why, given the current state of the world’s
political organization, international institutions should be less, rather
than more, accountable to member governments. He also lamented that
most reform discussions, even Eichengreen’s, fail to note that IMF loans
are intended to ease a variety of balance of payments problems, not just
those linked to ﬁnancial crisis, and that not all IMF loans result in moral
hazard. Still, he ﬁnds Eichengreen’s views on the moral hazard in crisis
lending persuasive and his suggestions for changes in bond contracts
sensible. He joined in calling on the U.S. Treasury to introduce collective
action clauses in its own bond contracts or explain why not. As for
exchange rate regimes, Bryant expressed strong dissatisfaction with the
new convention that most nations have just two options: a free ﬂoat or an
irrevocably ﬁxed peg. Bryant ﬁnds the search for the optimal regime
misguided, since exchange rate policy is context-dependent. No regime is
best for all times and circumstances, even for a single nation.
In his discussion, Vitor Gaspar referred to the extraordinarily large
number of reform proposals now aﬂoat and suggested that the ratio of
architects to builders has grown too large since, in the world economy,
management and enforcement are at least as important as grand designs.
Turning to Eichengreen’s four pillars, Gaspar agreed with Eichengreen’s
arguments concerning international standards and collective action
clauses. He did, however, have concerns about Eichengreen’s comments
on exchange rates and Chilean-style taxes on capital inﬂows, as well as on
his proposals for an independent and accountable IMF. While favoring
independent and accountable institutions, Gaspar found Eichengreen’s
suggestions wholly unrealistic for the foreseeable future since IMF
independence requires a degree of ﬁnancial autonomy unlikely to be
forthcoming. Moreover, accountability requires a clear mandate, and
Gaspar thought Eichengreen’s reference to facilitating policies that max-
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delegation.
Gaspar agreed that we are likely to see greater exchange rate
ﬂexibility, since it is now quite clear that pegs can lead to spectacular
crises, but he does not endorse the corner (fully free/fully ﬁxed) solution.
No exchange rate regime is intrinsically superior, he argued, and many
intermediate arrangements are viable—witness Denmark’s experience
with an interim solution. Crucially important is the consistency between
a country’s exchange rate regime, macro policies, and micro structure.
Finally, while Gaspar acknowledged that capital controls, like Chil-
ean-style taxes, can be useful when prudential regulation is inadequate,
they can also postpone important reforms. Thus, he reiterated the
well-known beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration for risk diversiﬁcation,
consumption smoothing, and the efﬁcient allocation of investment funds
and urged all countries to strengthen their supervisory capabilities to the
point where they can participate fully in global ﬁnancial markets.
In response, Eichengreen added that he did not intend to exclude the
industrial countries from responsibility for improving reporting require-
ments and dealing with the problems linked to derivatives. He also
assumed that the need for surveillance to cover macro policies was
entirely uncontroversial—witness the IMF’s new codes on monetary and
ﬁscal policy. As for an independent IMF, he noted that most central banks
have a broader mandate than that given the ECB and that the idea was no
more quixotic than a world currency or a true lender of last resort.
PRIORITIES IN REFORMING THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
A panel of distinguished policymakers from industrial countries and
emerging markets brought the conference to an end. Pedro Pou led off
with a discussion of Argentina’s interest in dollarization. In trying to
identify the root cause of recent crises, he discarded globalization and
increased capital ﬂows, observing that, by some measures, the world was
more “global” in the late 1800s than now, and capital/labor ratios are far
lower in developing than in industrialized countries. Instead, he pointed
to the increased use of ﬁat monies in the 30 years since the end of Bretton
Woods.
But, Pou asked, why should every country produce its own money
when no one suggests it should make every good? Why not buy money
from an efﬁcient producer? Although money is a potent symbol of
sovereignty and most nations want an independent monetary policy,
most small countries also have a low capital/labor ratio and need an open
capital account. But, under that condition, a small economy cannot have
an independent monetary policy with either ﬁxed or ﬂexible exchange
rates. Moreover, many countries have not yet developed institutions
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medium of exchange. Because investors regard these unstable monies
with great suspicion, emerging-market borrowers can only borrow short-
term in their own currency or long-term in other currencies. Faced with
the dangerous mismatches already discussed, “sustainable” conditions
can turn unsustainable very fast.
How can these vulnerabilities be reduced? The possibilities, Pou
suggested, include capital controls, an improved ILLR, or dollarization.
But, for countries short on capital, controls are counterproductive and
ineffective, and they promote corruption. Moreover, while an “im-
proved” ILLR might have reduced the risk of contagion and, thus,
Argentina’s borrowing costs, and while the new Contingent Credit Line
shows promise, Pou ﬁnds the issues surrounding the ILLR to be so
“difﬁcult” as to preclude much near-term progress on that front. That
leaves dollarization as the most viable route to stability.
To explain the beneﬁts of dollarization, Pou pointed out that Argen-
tina has had a successful economic program for eight years. Beyond
establishing a currency board, it has undertaken substantial reform and
now experiences lower inﬂation and faster productivity growth than the
United States. Yet, Argentina still faces large and variable country-risk
spreads that reduce investment. At the current pace, it will take another
eight to 16 years to eliminate this spread, and, even then, as a small, open
economy Argentina could not have an independent monetary policy.
By eliminating currency risk, dollarization would lower interest
rates, foster deeper domestic capital markets, boost investment and
growth, and reduce government debt service. But, Pou pointed out,
dollarization is not a substitute for good policies and is not for everyone.
He ended by listing the preconditions for dollarizing, which include the
following: a period of exchange rate stability with the dollar; inﬂation and
productivity growth similar to that in the United States; a strong ﬁscal
position and strong ﬁnancial system with no hidden public liabilities;
price and wage ﬂexibility; and as large a ratio of international reserves to
currency in circulation as possible, since these reserves will provide the
collateral enabling a domestic LLR.
Noting that her comments reﬂected Indonesia’s experiences,
Miranda Goeltom emphasized the need to prevent future crises by
building stronger public and private ﬁnancial institutions. She endorsed
international standards for both the public and private sectors but
cautioned against excessive reliance on market discipline.
Acknowledging the beneﬁts of free capital markets for development,
Goeltom noted that capital account liberalization did not lead to an
efﬁcient utilization of resources in Indonesia. Indonesia did not follow
the (now) accepted order in its liberalization sequence. It freed the capital
account before the current account and before developing a strong
regulatory system. With hindsight, less haste might have been preferable
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antees, and pervasive weak governance contributed to a serious misallo-
cation of credit and inﬂated asset prices. Moreover, Indonesia’s managed
ﬂoat was actually a ﬁxed-rate regime that encouraged highly leveraged
corporations to accumulate large unhedged liabilities in foreign currencies.
Because an open capital account is now the only viable option,
Indonesia is taking steps to strengthen its ﬁnancial system by improving
disclosure, transparency, and prudential supervision. In addition to
improved risk management within the banks, direct regulation will also
play a role, via such measures as limits on open positions and maturity
mismatches. Moreover, while capital controls are not a long-run solution,
they belong on the menu of policy options. Goeltom also stressed
enforcement, including closure of insolvent lenders.
Capital account liberalization requires consistent macroeconomic
and exchange rate policies. Indonesia’s new central bank law will
contribute by making Bank Indonesia independent and narrowing its
focus to promoting price stability. Moreover, the newly ﬂexible exchange
rate (the rupiah has been ﬂoating since August 1997) will underscore the
need to hedge, slowing the growth in foreign liabilities.
Goeltom concluded with observations on the international lender of
last resort. Indonesians expected that the multilateral rescue would help
them regain access to international markets. But the conditions imposed,
which included removal of popular subsidies and the closure of 16 banks
in a system without deposit insurance, sparked huge public protests that
undermined ofﬁcial support and aggravated market doubts about Indo-
nesia’s ability to deal with the crisis. Moreover, sizable IMF packages
produced modest initial disbursements. Thus, Goeltom suggested that
the restructuring of Indonesia’s interbank debt did more to restore
conﬁdence than the IMF rescue. She remains skeptical about the ability of
an ILLR to play a useful role.
Explaining why more signiﬁcant reform is under way than most
observers perceive, Jack Boorman chose IMF surveillance, the new
Contingent Credit Line, and private sector involvement to illustrate. First,
Boorman emphasized the greatly increased scope and strength of IMF
surveillance reﬂected in the new transparency reports, the data dissem-
ination standards, and the codes of good practice on ﬁscal policy and on
monetary and ﬁnancial policy. While the Fund is far from having a rating
system for member performance on these standards, Boorman suggested
that the Fund is moving cautiously in that direction. He stressed that
future surveillance will be more public than in the past. The ﬁrst
transparency reports (for the United Kingdom, Australia, and Argentina)
are already on the IMF’s website, and IMF members have agreed to
experimental release of the Fund’s annual surveillance reports. This
increased ﬂow of information—with judgments as well as facts—should
go a long way toward meeting private sector demands for information
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not differences in compliance show up in interest rate spreads will be
crucial to the effectiveness of these big changes in surveillance policy.
Boorman characterized the new Contingent Credit Line as another
step toward the new ﬁnancial architecture. The eligibility criteria for the
CCL include many elements—transparency, standards, private sector
involvement—associated with the new architecture. Moreover, the de-
bates on the new ﬁnancial architecture made the CCL possible, since
these discussions helped clarify the conditions under which IMF mem-
bers are willing to precommit IMF resources. Although the CCL goes
only a short way toward addressing the call for an ILLR focused on
systemic risk, Boorman believes that the new facility holds promise of
dramatic change in how the Fund responds to incipient crises.
Finally, Boorman noted that much discussion at the conference and
beyond has focused on the need to involve the private sector in resolving
future ﬁnancial crises. To date, however, few of the proposals for bailing
the private sector into crisis resolution have garnered wide support. So
far, the IMF Board has only endorsed lending into arrears, but many of
the ideas raised by Eichengreen and others are under discussion. While
some reformers hope to develop a set of rules for the private sector,
Boorman prefers a degree of ambiguity that, with the help of some ofﬁcial
ﬁnancing and some debtor country adjustment, can lead to spontaneous
recovery of market conﬁdence.
While Edwards and others argue that all the talk of reform will
bring little real change, Boorman is not convinced. At the moment, he
stressed, private lenders have the ball. They called for it, saying, “Give
us the problem cases, and we will help these countries through.” They
now have the problem cases—in Pakistan, Ecuador, Ukraine, Roma-
nia. If they do not help, sentiment for more substantive reform is likely
to grow.
In summarizing the impressions he would take from the conference,
E. Gerald Corrigan pointed to the need for humility on the part of
policymakers and practitioners. He then set out a list of reminders for
reformers to keep in mind. First, despite all the talk about Chilean-style
capital controls, in most crises domestic capital is the ﬁrst to ﬂee. Second,
most emerging market countries are very small and very open. Third, a
triangle not widely discussed at the conference is the incompatibility of
large current account deﬁcits, ﬁxed exchange rates, and weak banking
systems; with luck, a country may get away with one or two of those
conditions, but it will never get away with all three. And when the
current account is part of the problem, the resolution requires domestic
contraction; there is no painless alternative. Fifth, while weak banks and
a buildup of short-term foreign-currency liabilities are usually at the core
of a crisis, the quality of supervision is not the only issue—consider the
26 Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni P. OliveiU.S. ﬁnancial problems in the 1980s. Still, while Kaufman is right that
conditions in the industrial countries contributed to the crises in emerg-
ing markets, the crises were largely homegrown. And while bailing in the
private sector may be a good idea, like climbing Mount Everest in
sneakers, it will be difﬁcult to execute. Finally, since future shocks are
inevitable, reform requires a sense of urgency.
Turning to the next steps, Corrigan embraced the form and substance
of Bryant’s “pragmatic incrementalism.” The issue is not architecture, he
said, but plumbing and engineering. Designing new institutions would
take too long; we must ﬁnd ways to make existing institutions work
better. Citing the lessons of Edwards’s paper, he also warned that capital
controls represent a slippery slope, postponing needed reform and
providing incentives for circumvention. But being a pragmatist, he
added, “Never say never.” As a case in point, like Jeffrey Sachs, Corrigan
endorsed the use of prudential limits on short-term, foreign-currency
loans to banks in emerging markets. While the difference between
controls and improved supervision is substantive as well as semantic, the
crucially important improvements in banking supervision will take time.
Finally, noting the importance of fundamentals in determining the
viability of any exchange rate regime, he advocated ﬂexibility as the more
prudent choice for most emerging market countries, at least for now. As
for the preferred regime for the industrial countries, Corrigan chose to
punt to his good friend, Paul Volcker.
In taking up the challenge, Paul Volcker confessed to a little
skepticism as he listened. He was reminded, he said, of George Willis,
who was in charge of international ﬁnance at the U.S. Treasury when
Volcker arrived. In 1971 the world was facing the biggest international
ﬁnancial crisis in 50 years (such a crisis occurs once every 10 years,
Volcker noted), and a major international meeting was convened. When-
ever the delegates turned to George Willis for his reaction to a proposal,
he would growl, “It won’t work.” Pressed to say what would work, he
would respond, “Nothing.” Volcker argued that Willis’s response re-
mains relevant because ﬁnancial crises are built into the human genome.
When the whole genome is mapped, we will ﬁnd the genes for greed,
fear, and hubris, guaranteeing future ﬁnancial crises.
Explaining his skepticism about many reform proposals, Volcker
suggested that most, including those advocating more responsible eco-
nomic policies, were more akin to interior decoration than to architecture.
The conference outline had noted that “misguided national polices
produce harmful spillovers,” but, Volcker argued, it could have read
“policies produce harmful spillovers,” because good policies create harm-
ful spillovers as well. Indeed, the better a country’s policies, the more
capital it is likely to attract—and the more likely a bubble, eventual
collapse, and the conclusion that the country actually had bad policies.
He noted that IMF and World Bank documents published in mid 1997
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Indonesia and Thailand, although the materials did mention structural
weaknesses if you read far enough.
If good macro policies will not solve all problems, neither will strong
bank supervision. To illustrate, Volcker referred to the United States, the
home of strict supervision, and to our experiences with the Texas banks
in the eighties, with the largest bank in the country in the nineties, and,
in 1998, with LTCM, which required an ofﬁcially sponsored bailout to
avoid the possibility of bringing down the well-supervised, open Amer-
ican banking system.
Having disposed of supervision, transparency, and accounting stan-
dards, Volcker then stated as his basic theme that we are facing a broad
systemic problem that people have not been willing to recognize. All the
arguments about the IMF suggest a certain amount of myopia or
self-delusion, he suggested. While IMF actions must be judged on a case
by case basis, the real roots of the crisis in global capitalism lie in
technological change and national asymmetries. The rapidity with which
money can move around the world is widely recognized; less widely
recognized are the problems caused by differences in size. Many U.S.
banks are larger than the entire banking system in the smallest countries,
he noted. And no matter how good their macro policies and how strong
their banking systems, these small countries are liable to be inundated by
huge capital inﬂows. Indeed, the more attractive the country, the greater
its likely vulnerability.
In self-defense, countries and institutions seek to gain economic
weight the only way they can—by joining a bigger, more diversiﬁed
entity, Volcker pointed out. All of Argentina’s big banks are now foreign
owned, and foreigners will soon buy up Asian institutions in sales these
countries would have resisted just a few years ago. While this process will
spur recovery, Volcker agreed with Kaufman that these nations are likely
to feel they have been forced to sell their birthright within ﬁve years of
joining the global ﬁnancial system. We had better make sure that their
troubles are temporary, he urged.
That need brought him to exchange rates. The idea of a small country
ﬂoating is unworkable, he said; the practice does not occur in the real
world, where the instinct to ﬁx is strong. He also noted that an exchange
rate is a multilateral phenomenon; you cannot ﬂoat when others ﬁx or ﬁx
when others ﬂoat. Thus, the exchange rate system requires a coherence
that is currently lacking. While the solution for Mexico may be obvious,
given its links to this country, the answer for the Asian countries that
trade almost equally with Japan, Europe, and the United States is not so
clear. Indeed, Volcker concluded, exchange rate arrangements present
systemic problems that require a coordinated response.
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While the conference did not lead to broad proposals for reforming
the international monetary system, or even to widespread consensus on
many topics, the open and engaged atmosphere suggested an intense
effort to understand the problems that, from to time, confront all
countries participating in world markets. The discussion revealed a
measure of humility among the participants and a general recognition
that the questions raised were more difﬁcult and the answers less obvious
than most of us had thought not too long ago. Nevertheless, while
systemic solutions remained elusive, the conference participants ap-
proached agreement or clariﬁed their differences on several important
issues. This summary section outlines the major themes developed at the
conference and, by deﬁning areas of disagreement, suggests where
economists and policymakers may want to focus their future efforts.
Exchange Rates
Although a few participants claimed that, with good fundamentals,
any exchange rate regime becomes feasible, most seemed to believe, with
Cooper, that the choice of an exchange rate regime is crucially important
and not at all simple. Indeed, Ralph Bryant may have put it best when he
said that no exchange rate regime is right under all circumstances and at
all times, even for a single country. Still, some arrangements are clearly
worse than others, and most attendees accepted that ﬁxed but adjustable
rates are a recipe for disaster. Yet many also recognized that the volatility
of freely ﬂoating rates can create serious problems for small, capital-
scarce countries that really need an open capital account. Given that these
small, open economies can ﬁnd it difﬁcult to maintain an independent
monetary policy under any exchange rate arrangement, a subset of the
participants expressed sympathy for the idea that such countries might
want to join a currency union or adopt a dollarization scheme. But since
few countries are currently candidates for such a step, dollarization was
generally viewed as a future possibility.
As for the large countries, a few participants argued that even the
G-3 may eventually develop a taste for target zones or a single world
currency. In making this argument, Cooper cited the currency markets’
periodic instability, the probability that ﬁnancial developments will
increasingly determine exchange rates, and the likelihood that national
differences will shrink in importance. Finally, as Paul Volcker noted,
exchange rates are by deﬁnition multilateral, and the lack of coherence in
current arrangements represents a systemic problem that will ultimately
require a coordinated response.
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Without exception, everyone at the conference acknowledged that
open capital markets are crucially important for the efﬁcient allocation
of resources and optimal risk-sharing. Thus, as a general rule, and in the
long run, free capital markets are to be encouraged. But, given the
obvious volatility of short-term capital ﬂows and their role in recent
ﬁnancial crises, most participants now view the issue of capital controls
in the context of the optimal sequencing of reforms. As several speakers,
including Edwards, Cline, and de Swaan, emphasized, we now recog-
nize, belatedly, that current account liberalization, labor market ﬂexibil-
ity, and ﬁscal prudence are all prerequisites for successful capital account
liberalization. Moreover, open capital markets are likely to lead to
disaster in countries that lack strong ﬁnancial supervision and transpar-
ent accounting standards. In a world in which the social risk associated
with large capital ﬂows to small emerging markets greatly exceeds the
private risk, many participants have also come to accept, with varying
degrees of reluctance, that temporary capital controls should remain on
the menu of policy options. Several individuals suggested that the
imposition and removal of such controls must be subject to IMF surveil-
lance.
Surveillance
Most participants embraced the use of internationally agreed stan-
dards as the basis for multilateral surveillance, as recommended by
Eichengreen. They noted that the development of these codes of good
conduct will require input from expert practitioners but that compliance
will likely require IMF assessment as well as private sector use of these
assessments. A few individuals also stressed that surveillance must cover
macro as well as micro issues in large and small countries. The plight of
small countries that have sound policies and attract huge capital inﬂows
when world liquidity is ample highlights this need. While many partic-
ipants were skeptical that the extensive talk of reform would result in
anything more than tinkering, a few, including Boorman and Eichen-
green, argued that the scope and bite of surveillance has already
increased signiﬁcantly. They emphasized the role of transparency in
enhancing the credibility and inﬂuence of multilateral institutions.
International Lender of Last Resort
Although a few participants dismiss the need for an ILLR, preferring
to rely on the private markets to allocate liquidity, most agreed that, in
the end, the world must have an international lender of last resort.
Nevertheless, noting the constraints facing the IMF as ILLR and the hard
issues surrounding its rescue programs, most attendees would clearly
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suggested improving supervision, transparency, and good governance;
ending the use of exchange rate pegs; and imposing capital controls on an
emergency basis. In addition, many joined Sachs in advocating that
alternatives to IMF loan packages be explored. They would give the
private sector more responsibility for crisis resolution, for instance, and
develop the IMF’s role as crisis manager, rather than as crisis lender. Still,
several individuals were concerned that “bail-in” efforts could be desta-
bilizing, and few advocated increased use of standstills on debt repay-
ment.
While the majority emphasized the international community’s obvi-
ous reluctance to give the IMF, or any international organization, the
resources and powers it would need to function as a true ILLR, a few
noted that the new Contingent Credit Line shows promise of representing
a signiﬁcant step in that direction. Finally, while most participants
endorsed Bryant’s “pragmatic incrementalism” and resisted pushing too
hard for reforms the world is not yet ready to accept, a few saw a growing
need to create institutions of collective governance to offset market
failures in the international arena. Despite his warning, Bryant encour-
aged efforts to stretch and strengthen multilateral cooperation, while
Keohane predicted that democracies will want to expand international
government to balance the inﬂuence of the mobile and the immobile
factors of production.
In the end, thus, the participants left with a full agenda for design
and implementation work in each of the key areas covered. Overall,
developing the political will to proceed appears the main challenge.
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